ORIGIN

V.

Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals For the United States of America


NOV 1 9 2014 SO

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 4:14-CR-00023-A

CHRISTOPHER ROBERT WEAST

Emergency Writ of Prohibition And Automatic Stay



Comes Now CHRISTOPHER ROBERT WEAST by and through Christopher Robert, (Heroinafter "Relator") a living soul manifest known as Man, and bearing witness with my own eyes and attest through my own hand, this notice and free will writing by Christopher Robert Demanding a Writ of Prohibition Issue out of necessity and an Automatic Stay, peacefully and respectfully on this 4th day of November in the Year Two Thousand and Fourteen.

FACTS

I There exists on the record, multiple due process violations under the Constitution for the united states of America, starting with the most obvious and most important one, wherein John McBryde refused to allow Relator and/or "Defendant" into any part of the alleged trial which was held on July 28th and 29th, 2014, Relator was forced into a room with a TV manitor which was on mute, in ankle shackles,

handcuffs and waiste chain, which Relator objected to countless times.

- 2. Relator was prevented from participating in the alleged voir dire and therefore was prevented the apportunity and equal protection to question the potential juros to see if they were indeed a jury of "Defendant's" peers.
- 3. John McBryde has been acting under "color of Law" by acting as though the court is operating under Article 111 of the Constitution for the united states of America, when in fact, the court is operating under Article IV of the Constitution of the United States which is the same United States defined in 28 U.S.C. 3002(15)(a) as a corporation.
- 4. If Relator were to file a lawsuit against the United States corporation, the court would convene in an Article III capacity and petition to have the case dismissed for lack of Article III standing by an injured party yet the corporate United States brings an action against Relator and does not have to prove Article III standing which tells me that McBryde is operating under some secret jurisdiction which equivalent to acting under color of law.
- 5. Relator repeatedly informed the judge that he did not understand the nature and cause of the charge (s) yet McBryde arbitrarily and capriciously entered a

plea of not guilty" for "defendant" when Relator Clearly did not refuse to enter a plea an May 28, 2014 nor was Relator given the opportunity to understand the nature and cause of the charge, as prescribed by the Constitution for the United states of America, Sixth Amendment, and again at the July 8, 2014 and July 11, 2014 "arraignment hearings," At each and every "arraignment accept the February 21, 2014 arraignment, Relator thought he understand due to a Mistake of fact and Mistake of law Relator due to a Mistake of fact and Mistake of Law, Relator repeatedly sought to understand the nature and cause of the charge(S) and McBryde repeatedly violated Relator's Sixth Amendment Right to understand the nature and cause of the charges) by arbitrarily and capriciously entering a plea of not quitty on the "defendants" behalf without even attempting to help Relator to understand the nature and cause." A violation of the 6th Amendment Right is not subject to harmless error review, but requires automatic reversal. United States v. Starusko, 729 F. 2d 256 (3d. Cir. 1984) 6. McBryde further violated Relator's Sixth Amendment Right by preventing Relator from representing the "defendant" in the instant case. It is well settled that People have the Right to defend themselves under the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution for the United States of America. Faretta v. California McBryde did not allow Relator in the courtroom at any point during the sham McBryde referred to as a trial therefore Relator's Sixth Amendment Right to

represent the defendant was denied by McBride who refers to People asking questions and attempting to understand, "disruptive" Before taking action against a disruptive Idefendant, the court should warn the Idefendant of the consequences of his or her continued disruptive behavior, "[Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970)] yet McBryde did not allow Relator into any of the trial, from start to finish. McBryde, as the record will show, never warned Relator that the court would deny him the Right to proceed "Svi Juris" if he continued to ask questions and "if a Idefendant? who is appearing prose disrupts the proceedings, the court should first warn the Idefendant! That if there is any further disruption the court will deny him or her the Right to proceed pro se (Sui Juris) and will direct standby counsel.

Furthermore, not only was Relator's Sixth Amendment
Right violated by preventing him from representing the
"Referdant", but Relator's Rights were also violated,
mainly No Relator's First Amendment Right to speak
Thornburgh v. Abbotts, 490 U.S. 401, 407 (1989)] each
time McBryde had Relator forcibly removed for asking
questions which McBryde either could not answer or
was protecting the alleged government prosecutor from
having to answer. When the government prosecutor
wished to speak, McBryde did NOT attempt to speak
over her and then accuse her of being disruptive yet
when Relator tried to speak and ask questions, McBryde
would interrupt repeatedly which is a violation of

| | P. L. V. D. L. L. C. |
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| | nelators hight to equal protection, LGulf, C. + S. F.R. Co. v. |
| - | Relator's Right to equal protection, [Gulf, C. + S.F.R. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150(1897) as well as Relator's Sixth |
| ١ | rimenament Right to understand the nature and cause |
| | of the charge(s). |
| | |
| | The Right of a [defendant] to engage in a searching and |
| l | wide-ranging cross-examination of any government witness is an essential requirement for a fair trial," |
| ŀ | witness is an essential requirement for a fair trial." |
| L | [United States v. Jones, 557 F. J.J. 1237 / 846 Cir. 1977 \] |
| | and the authority of the court to limit cross- |
| 1 | and the authority of the court to limit cross- examinations comes into play only after the Idefendant] has been permitted to exercise sufficient cross- |
| | has been permitted to exercise sufficient crass- |
| • | and illiaviole to savisty the sixth Amenament / United |
| • | Spaces V. 1011 (ver, 665, 1.2d, 1005 (11th Cir. 1982); |
| İ | United States v. Haimowitz, 706 F. 2d 1549 (11th Cir. |
| 1 | 100) Lyet 1 coude clearly showed his bias aminst |
| | Relator by preventing him to have his opportunity to |
| | Relator by preventing him to have his opportunity to face his accusers), and question them on the |
| ١ | he questions which were asked at all by the |
| Ì | the questions which were asked at all by the |
| ĺ | utionitely who were torced upon Kelator in violation |
| | T the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution for the |
| | mited states of America (without the United States) |
| 4 | Unich states "In all criminal researching the |
| 1 | ccused shall enjoy the Right to a speedy and public |
| , | rial, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for |
| • | scused shall enjoy the Right to a speedy and public rial, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense. (Emphasis added) |
| | |
| | t does not say he shall have counsel. It only ays he shall have the Right to have the assistance |
| 5 | ays he shall have the Right to have the assistance |
| | |

| of Counsel for his defense, and the Right to have |
|--|
| counsel does not justify a court forcing a lawyer upon an accused who does not want one. See Istate v. |
| Penderville, 2 Utah 2d 281, 272 P.2d 195; Moore v. |
| State of Michigan, 355 U.S. 155, 78 S.Ct. 191, 2 L.Ed. |
| 2d 167 also see Duett v. Turner, 266, 439 P. 2d |
| 266, 20 Utah 2d 403 (1968).] |

- 8. During the alleged trial, Aisha Saleers, the government attorney, made repeated remarks implying that Relator's silence after receiving a Miranda warning indicated his guilt yet it is reversible error for the prosecutor to imply that the Idefendant's I silence after receiving a Miranda warning indicates guilt." [United States v. Baker, 999 F.2d 412 (9th Cir. 1993)]. During Aisha Saleers's closing statements, she made a direct reference to the fact that Relator chose to maintain his silence after receiving a Miranda warning, claiming Relator must be guilty because he chose to remain silent.
- 9. During the prosecutor's openning statement, she was allowed by McBryde, to communicate her own personal evaluation of the 'case" to the jury which is reflected in the transcripts Relator has been denied repeatedly although [Griffin v. Illinois, 351] U.S. 12 (1956)] provides that the Right of an indigent [defendant] to a free transcript is fundamental in aiding of appealing his conviction.

| 10. | McBryde committed reversible error by preventing |
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| | alleged "defense" attorneys from fully cross-examining |
| | witnesses wherein McBryde acted at though he |
| | was the only one allowed to cross-examine the |
| | governments witness, and although "a trial judge |
| | may interrogate a witness to clarify the witness's |
| | may interrogate a witness to clarify the witness's testimony or to ensure that a case is fairly tried. |
| | However, when the attorneys are competently |
| | However, when the attorneys are competently conducting their cases, it is improper for the |
| | trial judge to question the witnesses. By doing |
| | so, the judge places the opposing counsel in a |
| | so, the judge places the opposing counsel in a disadvantageous position. The attorney may |
| _ | hesitate to object to the judge's examination |
| | hesitate to object to the judges examination for fear of creating, or giving the appearance |
| | of creating, a conflict with the judge." |
| | United States v. Welliver, 601 F. 2d 203 (5th |
| | Cir. 1979), overruled on other grounds by United |
| | States v. Adamson, 700 F.2d 953 (5th Cir. 1983)]. |
| | |
| 11. | McBryde committed reversible error when he |
| Ĭ | prevented Relator and defendant from being |
| | present during selection of the jury wherein, |
| | Lastra and Marionette of the long minimized |

Presented Relator and defendant from being present during selection of the jury wherein, neither helator nor defendant had given personal on-the record waiver of his Right to be present.

"It is reversible error for the trial court to impanel the jury in the [defendants] absence without a personal on-the-record waiver of his or her right to be present. A representation by defense coursel is not sufficient." [United States v. Gordan, 829 F.2d 119 (D.C. Cir. 1987)].

| 12 | These proceedings have failed to produce competent evidence of an injured party as required in an Article III court. These proceedings have failed to produce a single efficient of the first of the fir |
|-----|--|
| | evidence of an injured party as required in an Article |
| | Ill court. These proceedings have failed to produce a |
| | pingle altitude of verified complaints of the existence of |
| | a real complaining party. These proceedings have failed |
| | a real complaining party. These proceedings have failed to produce an injured party as plaintiff on to the witness stand for testimony. The real party of interest |
| | witness stand for testimony. The real party of interest |
| • | 15 being concealed-not identified. The alleged |
| | plaintiff/libellant appear fictious. The U.S. attorney |
| | demonstrates no evidence of delegated authority to |
| | preserve and inerefore appears to be acting without |
| | authority. See U.S. Attorney Manual Section 6-4.270 |
| | tor proof. There appears no contract or franchise |
| •• | agreement or license in evidence compelling performance |
| * | of connecting negation so the brace or business |
| | franchise codified in I.R.C. Subtitle A. |
| 13. | The 115 Atterna has withhall and is and in |
| | The U.S. Attorney has withheld and is continuing to withhold material evidence. The U.S. Attorney offers |
| | nothing of substance to this court. The plaintiff has |
| | not of produced any evidence of a legal liability |
| | of duty inder any of Title 18 ar moves that as |
| | or duty under any of Title 18 nor proven that any part of Title 18 even constitutes evidence of such |
| | a duby. |
| | 3 |
| | Duty. A thing due: that which is due form a recease |
| | Duty. A thing due; that which is due from a person; that which a person owes to another. An obligation |
| - 1 | UD WO W UTURAL IT WORK OT MATE. EXTENSIVE. SAMIFICATION |
| | than "debt," although both are expressed by the same |
| | than "debt," although both are expressed by the same Latin word "debitum." Sometimes, however, the |
| | The state of the s |

| • | tern is used synonymously with debts. |
|----|---|
| | Those obligations of performance, care, or observance |
| | which rest upon a person in an official or fiduciary |
| | which rest upon a person in an official or fiduciary capacity; as the duty of an executor, trustee, manager, etc. |
| , | [(Blacks Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, page 453)] |
| 1. | I have read 1 U.S.C. \$204 of your church bible and |
| | I have tound it to say that the entire Crimina Code |
| ! | Is nothing more than "prima tacie evidence". The term |
| | prima tacie is legally defined as simply a presumption. |
| | Therefore, it appears to Relator that McBryde's some |
| | COURT IS practicing something akin to |
| , | religion, rather than law, where presumption serves |
| | as the equivalent of religious taith and unsubstantiated |
| - | hearsay evidence. This appears to be a violation of |
| ı | und establishment clause of the first menament. |
| | YOU KIUOW that you can't establish a religion or |
| 1 | torce Me_bo participate in your state soonsored |
| | church using a majority vote of "electors" on a |
| | jury. In Relator's mind this proceeding is an act |
| | church using a majority vote of "electurs" on a jury. In Relator's mind this proceeding is an act_of witchcraft by a satanic cabal. |
| | "Has the LORD as great delight in burnt offerings and |
| ŀ | 3401111(23) |
| | As in obeying the voice of the LORA? |
| | Behold, to obey is better than sacrifice, |
| ١ | And to heed than the fat of rams. |
| ı | For rebellion [of either the Constitution for the united |

states of America or the Bible is as the sin of witchcraft, And stubbornness is as iniquity and idolatry
Because you have rejected the word [and laws] of the
Isovereign.] LORD [or "We the Reople" in the Constitution
for the united States of America],
He also has rejected you from being king land a sovereign
over your government as a private Citizen, or a public
securat. servant 1. [1 Sam. 15:22-23, Bible, NKJV] 15. Through this unlawful proceeding, I have found that McBryde is attempting to criminalize non-payment of tithes to a state sponsored Church. The "establishment of religion" clause of the first Amendment means at least this: neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one Istate-sponsored political religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force or influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against his will, or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whotever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can openly or

or secretily, participate in the affoirs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa."

[Everson v. Bd. of Ed., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947)]

The Establishment Clause is infringed when the government makes adherence to la STATE-SPONSORED PAGAN LEGAL religion relevant to a person's standing in the political community. Direct government action endocring religion or a particular religious practice is invalid under this approach, because it sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political community. Livallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 69 (1985)]

16. McBryde is NOT exercising his only affirmative responsibility—a duty to protect Relator, but rather appears to be protecting the retirement and paycheck of himself and the officers of the court, including the U.S. Attorney, Angela Saad, Christopher A. Curtis, Peter Fleury and Megan Fahey. It is abusing even the color of law to elevate its own importance and effect involuntary servitude.

17. There appears no consent to this matter by Relator in evidence.

| 18. | Relator has not knowingly, willingly and voluntarily |
|-----|--|
| | Relator has not knowingly, willingly and voluntarily contracted away his Sovereignty. If Relator had, it |
| | would be deemed an unconscionable contract and not |
| | enforceable by an honorable court. When Relator |
| | wants to sue you, Relator must produce statutory |
| | evidence that you consented or waived sovereign |
| | immunity. The same EQUAL requirement applies to |
| | you in respect to Relator. There is no evidence on |
| | the record of these proceedings that I ever |
| | expressly waived sovereign immunity under the |
| | Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S. C. \$1605 |
| | and therefore, I am immune from your jurisdiction |
| | since said alleged crime consummated in Fort Worth, |
| | Texas State Non Domestic, Non Federal and involving |
| | alkeded commerce only in places outside of the |
| | United States, so that the actions alleged does |
| | NOT involve "commercial activity carried on in the |
| | United States" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. |
| | \$1605(a)(2), nor does the complaint involve a |
| | tortious act that resulted in personal injury, death, |
| | or loss of property "occuring in the United States," |
| | within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. \$ 1605(a)(5). |
| | 4 |
| | "An appearance by a foreign state does not confer personal jurisdiction when it does not otherwise exist under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605-1607. 28 U.S.C. |
| | personal jurisdiction when it does not otherwise |
| | exist under 28 U.S.C. 38 1605-1607. 28 U.S.C. |
| | § 1330(ඨ." |
| _ | |
| • | "The words 'people of the United States and Citizens," |
| | "The words 'people of the United States' and 'Citizens,' are synonymous terms, and mean the same thing. |
| | |

They both describe the political body who, according to our republican institutions, form the sovereignty, and who hold the power and conduct the government through their representatives. They are what we familiarly call the sovereign people, and every Citizen is one of this people, and a constituent member of this sovereignty...

[Boyd v. State of Nebraska, 143 U.S. 135 (1892)]

19. In essence these proceedings have failed to produce and to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

By willful omission and silence of the Plaintiff and the court in dealing with the above issues, you have agreed with everything Relator has said and is now saying, and that this is an unlawful persecution of an innocent Man. Calling such issues "frivolous" simply confirms that this is a state sponsored church, that Relator is a heretic, and that McBryde, the court and the Plaintiff agree with everything that Relator has said. The term "frivilous" is defined in the Federal Pleading Attachment attached to some of my pleadings in the court as "truthful, accurate, and consistent with prevailing law." Relator thanks the court and Plaintiff for agreeing with him by remaining silent. If McBryde, the court, or the Plaintiff want to be known as, or even referred to as, honorable, then they should know and be

fully aware that silence equates with fraud where there is a moral or legal duty to act, or where such an omission would cause a violation of Rights and of the constitutional oaths of the officers of this federal church.

20. Overwhelming evidence suggests that the court, McBryde, and the Plaintiff, and this establishment are a private, for profit corporation, not a government, and the only product or service they may have lawful authority to deliver is "protection". Relator has a Right to NOT procure your corporate "product" or services and to reserve, back to himself, the powers he may have erroneously delegated to the court or Plaintiff by lawfully and timely withdrawing my dornicile, allegiance, and support and becoming a nonresident and a transient foreigner. The Declaration of Independence makes this my DUTY. To wit:

"But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their Right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security."

[Declaration of Independence, 1776]

Who is the courty McBryde, or the Plaintiff to interfere with that duty of organic law? Any

effort to compel me to procure your only product or service is a usurpation and is unlawful under the Sherman Antitrust Act. It also constitutes what this court has called a RICO protection racket which is engaging in systematic acts of racketeering. If the court, McBryde, or the Plaintiff were a real government, they would provide ALL the services they offer to everyone and treat them ALL equally, including those who don't have government numbers and those who don't participate in your voluntary franchises—franchises carefully disguised to look mandatory. Equal treatment is the foundation of all free governments: "No duty rests more imperatively upon the courts than the enforcement of those constitutional provisions intended to secure that equality of Rights which is the foundation of free government." [Gulf, C.& S. F.R. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150 (1897) Relator is a Sovereign Free-man on the land. There is NO "consent of the governed" involved in any aspect of this unlawful proceeding. And further, as to consent - McBryde knows, or should know, that consent is the origin of all lawful authority on this planet and all of the courts delegated and lawful authority. In our republican form of government, the requirement of consent in all human interaction is the essence and foundation of all sovereignty as individuals. The consent

requirement is also the foundation of our system of law beginning with the unanimous Declaration of the thirteen united States of America—also known as the Declaration of Independence in the year "That to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed." [Declaration of Independence, 1776] Consensus facit legem. Consent makes the law. A contract is a law between the parties, which can acquire force only by consent. [Bouvier's Maxims of Law, 1856; Source: http://famguardian.org/Publications/ Bouvier MaximsOfLaw/Bouviers Maxims. htm] Relator never knowingly nominated the court, McBryde, or the Plaintiff as his protector by unwittingly chaosing a domicile or residence on federal territory within the courts, or the Plaintiffs juittelies alleged jurisdiction or by knowingly, willfully and voluntarily and with Full disclosure participating in any alleged government activities franchise. McBiyde, the courts, and the Plaintiff have been officially and formally fired as my protector because Relator has found that the only thing the courts or Plaintiff

protect is their own vain selves—go their retirement checks, office, and importance. The court and U.S. attorney as private individuals have clearly operated outside the bounds of their supposed jurisdiction and delegated authority and are mere trespassers who have surrendored judicial, official, and sovereign immunity and are simply acting as private individuals managing a sharr trust for their own personal benefit. "An affirmance results, when a judge acts in the clear absence of all jurisdiction, i.e., of authority to act officially over the subject-matter in hand, the proceeding is coramnon judice. In such a case the judge has lost his judicial function, has become a mere private ettera person, and is liable as a tresposser for the darrages resulting from his unauthorized acts. Such has been the law from the days of the case of The Marshalsea, 10 Cake 68. It was recognized as such in Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. (80 U.S.) 335, 351, 20 L. Ed. 646. In State ex rel. Egan v. Wolever, 127 Ind. 306, 26 N. E. 762, 763, the court said: The converse statement of ite is also ancient. Where there is no jurisdiction at all there is no judge; the proceeding is as nothing. Honesty of purpose and sincere belief that appellant was acting in the discharge of his official duty under his outh of office and for the public

| welfare is not available as a defense further th | a 10 |
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| | |
| in mitigation of damages. See Glazar v. Hubbar | |
| 102 Ky. 68, 69, 42 S.W. 1114, 39 L. R. A. 210, 80 | 0.00 |
| Am. St. Rep. 340; Prell v. McDonald, 7 Kan. 266, | 285 |
| 12 Am. Rep. 423; De Courcey v. Cox, 94 Cal. 665, | 669, |
| 30 P. 95; Truesdell v. Combs, 33 Ohio St. 186, | 194. |
| [Manning v. Ketcham, 58 F. 2d 948 (1932)] | |
| | |
| I won't indemnify the clearly illeral unlessful | and |
| I won't indemnify the clearly illegal, unlawful, injurous conduct Relator has suffered at the h | . /. |
| of officer of Moral and the Italy | anas |
| of officers of McBrydes court by offering my | |
| consent. That would cause me to lose standing | |
| to sue the usurping trespassers for clear viole | ction |
| of my protected rights because he who consent | |
| of my protected rights because he who consents cannot claim an injury from what he consents | ton |
| MS I see it the anti-comingle in McKn. dec | |
| courtroom are the officiers of McBrydes de | |
| facto court. | نیف سیمی این مین میشود این |
| | |
| Mc Buda has constally had as Rolates family | · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · |
| McBryde has repeatedly had me Relator forcibly dragged out of proceedings while Relator was | |
| aragged out of proceedings while nelator was | ~ |
| attempting to speak to the Record in violation | ot |
| attempting to speak to the Record in violation Relator's First Amendment Right to speak. [The Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 407 (1989)] | mburgh v. |
| Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 407 (1989)] | · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · |
| | |
| Not only was it a violation of Relators first | |
| Amendment Rights to have him facicibly comme | red. |
| from each and every hearing had in McBrydet courtroom, and forcibly prevented from I present at the SHAM Trial held on July 28 and | |
| courtmen. Stand facility accounted from | ain a |
| present at the SUAM Total Lall as Til. 20 - 1 | 7011 |
| Liesens on nim outility und ou soil go and | atun _y |
| | |

2014, but it was also a violation of Relatort Sixth Amendment Right to an impartial jury in the district where crime shall have been committed, as well as Relator's Sixth Amendment Right to confront witnesses, and kin Relator's & Sixth Amendment Right to compel witnesses to testify in Relator's defense. [Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967)]

Relator's fifth Amendment Right to life liberty and

Relators fifth Amendment Right to life, liberty, and property have been deprived since February 21, 2014 without due process of law.

During the alleged trial, Relator was forcibly compelled to sit in a room with a TV monitor with less than par sound quality, preventing Relator from hearing most everything being said in the alleged trial. Relator was prevented from objecting by use of an officer of the court who kept the mic muted on the TV conference so that noone in the court could see or hear Relator, again, in violation of Relator's first Amendment Right to Speak.

Relator's first Amendment Right to obtain meaningful access to the courts by (BOP) Bureau of Prisons employees who have prevented Relator's legal mail from going out in the mail, stopped Relator's mail coming from Relator's Sixth Amendment Counsel of Choice which the BOP claims they do not recognize, as well as keeping letters which

were sent from the fifth Circuit Court of Appeals to Relator regarding his appeals, and causing said appeals to be denied. BUP employees also kept responses from the U.S. Attorney that were in response to motions that Relator had filed, until after Relator's alleged SHAM Trial. In fact, the BOP and its employees have systematically done everything in their power to deny Relator access to the courts and/or any materials Relator's family has attempted to send him via the mail. BOP employees have denied Relator's postal mail, including legal mail, confidential communications, and special mail which were petitions, affidavits, and motions Relator was attempting to file into the court.

The BOP employees took Relator's access to email after Relator started using his email account to draft pleadings in a less time consuming manner than by hand. After taking Relator's access to email, BOP employees then took Relator's access to his phone so that Relator could not easily communicate with his chosen Assistance of Counsel, which is clearly on the record under Appointment by Relator of Constitutional Counsel.

McBryde violated the Federal Rules of Criminal proceedure when he held an alleged trial without first ruling on Relator's open motions before trial was had. This further evidences McBryde's

| Bias and préjudice against Relator. | |
|---|-------------|
| Both McBryde and the U.S. attorney knew that | |
| Relator had filed a lawsvit against them prior | |
| to the alleged trial yet neither McBryde nor | |
| Aisha Saleon rocused thomself. Instead, Mc Bryde | |
| chose to be violate the maxim that "No man can | |
| be judge in his own case. | |
| Jest Jest Jest Jest Jest Jest Jest Jest | |
| In Calder v. Bull, which was here in 1798, Mr. Justice | |
| hase said, that there were acts which the | |
| ederal and State legislatures could not do without | |
| exeeding their authority, and among them he | · · |
| rentioned a law which punished a citizen for an | |
| nnocent act; a law that destroyed or impaired | |
| the lawful private contracts of citizens; a law | |
| that made a man judge in his aver as and | |
| that made a man judge in his own case; and | |
| I law that took the property from A. and gave | |
| t to B. It is against all reason and justice, he | |
| dded, for a people to intrust a legislature with | |
| such powers, and therefore it cannot be presumed | |
| that they have done it. They may command what | |
| s right and prohibit what is wrong; but they | |
| hange innocence into guilt, or punish innocence as | |
| awful private contract, or the Right of private property. | |
| awtul private contract, or the Kight of private property. | |
| a maintain that a tederal of state legislature | |
| ossesses such powers it they had not been expressly | |
| restrained, would, in my opinion, be a political horesy | |

| altogether in | nadmissible in all free republican government. |
|---|---|
| Sinking Fund | L Cases, 99 U.S. 700, (1878)] |
| McDryde ha | s an illegal contract, called a W4 with |
| if he does n | ho can dimish his salary and/or retinement of ensure that Relator and others |
| maintain th | vated, will be found quitty in order to contract between the federal government |
| | P in order to keep the BOP's prisons Full. |
| and Demand | the reasons state herein, Relator seeks a that a Writ of Prohibition issue |
| to McBryde jurisdictiona Relator ever | preventing him trom usurping his lauthority even further and injuring |
| | |
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| , . | Respectfully Submitted, All Rights Reserved Lilbrio Roberts (Pro Hac Vice) |
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Certificate of Service

The undersigned hereby certifies that the foregoing EMERGENCY PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS / AUTOMATIC STAY DOCKET NO. 14-11223 was served upon the parties named listed below by placing a copy of same in the U.S. Mail, Priority First Class Postage Paid, addressed to:

Judge John H. McBryde

c/o 510 West 10th Street Room 310 Fort Worth, Non Domestic Texas [zip code exempt DMM 602 1.3 e. (2)]

Aisha Saleem-DOJ

US Attorney's Office c/o 801 Cherry Street Unit 4 Suite 1700 Fort Worth, Non Domestic Texas [zip code exempt DMM 602 1.3 e. (2)]

Daniel Preston Cole-DOJ

United States Attorney's Office c/o 801 Cherry Street
Suite 1700
Fort Worth, Non Domestic
Texas [[zip code exempt DMM 602 1.3 e. (2)]

Megan J Fahey-DOJ

US Attorney's Office c/o 801 Cherry Street Unit 4 Suite 1700 Fort Worth, Non Domestic Texas [zip code exempt DMM 602 1.3 e. (2)]

Christopher A Curtis-FPD

Federal Public Defender - Fort Worth c/o 819 Taylor Street
Room 9A10
Fort Worth, Non Domestic
Texas [zip code exempt DMM 602 1.3 e. (2)]

Peter Michael Fleury-FPD

Federal Public Defender - Fort Worth c/o 819 Taylor Street
Room 9A10
Fort Worth, Non Domestic
Texas [zip code exempt DMM 602 1.3 e. (2)]

Angela R Saad-FPD

Federal Public Defender c/o 819 Taylor Street Room 9A10 Fort Worth, Non Domestic Texas [zip code exempt DMM 602 1.3 e. (2)]

This the 14th day of November, 2014.

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Chris Robert (Pro Hac Vice)

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